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Abstract* 
 
This article deals with one of the most interesting contemporary conflicts between fundamental rights, that 
concerning freedom of thought, conscience and religion, with particular reference to the use of the Islamic 
headscarf use in educational institutions (I, The conflict). As an illustration of this conflict, we shall focus 
on one particular case, Leyla Sahin’s case, brought before the European Court of Human Rights in 2004 
(II, The case). That case will be our starting point, as it contains some of the essential “coordinates” which 
must be borne in mind when resolving such conflicts. Our next step will be to identify these "coordinates" 
(III, The coordinates). Then with these coordinates we shall examine the “course” set by the different 
rulings that have been handed down in order to resolve the conflict and by the specific legislation enacted 
(IV, The course). Finally, we shall attempt to draw certain conclusions (V, Conclusion). 
 
 
El presente trabajo aborda uno de los más interesantes conflictos entre derechos fundamentales de los 
últimos tiempos; el referido a la libertad de pensamiento, conciencia y religión, en particular, al uso del velo 
islámico en el ámbito educativo (I, El conflicto). Como ejemplo de dicho conflicto, nos centraremos en un 
caso concreto, el asunto Leyla Sahin defendido ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos en el año 
2004 (II, El caso). El citado caso será nuestro punto de partida, pues contiene alguna de las "coordenadas" 
esenciales que deben de tenerse en cuenta al abordar tales conflictos. Identificar tales coordenadas en la 
jurisprudencia y en la normativa, será nuestro siguiente paso (III. Las coordenadas). Una vez identificadas 
tales coordenadas, analizaremos el "rumbo" seguido por los tribunales que han abordado dichos conflictos, 
así como por la normativa adoptada al respecto por el legislador (IV. El rumbo). Finalmente, trataremos de 
“arribar a buen puerto” (V, Conclusiones). 
 
Título: El velo islámico: ¿hasta qué punto el contexto es importante? 
 
Keywords: Islamic Headscarf; Freedom of Religion; Educational Institutions; Europe; Conflicts between 
Fundamental Rights 
Palabras clave: velo islámico; libertad religiosa; instituciones educativas; Europa; conflictos entre derechos 
fundamentales 
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* Texto de la conferencia pronunciada en la International Conference on Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, 
celebrado en el Human Rights Centre de la Universidad de Gante (Bélgica) el 15 y 16 de diciembre de 2006. 
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1. The conflict 
 
One of the most interesting contemporary conflicts between fundamental rights is that involving 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion: and in particular that concerning the use of the 
Islamic headscarf in educational institutions. It is worth noting that many cases dealing with this 
question have come before the courts in European countries in recent years. Some deserve special 
consideration, such as for instance Ferestha Ludin’s case before the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany in 2003, or the case of Begum v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School 
[2004], recently reversed by the House of Lords on 22 March 2006. Moreover, the European Court 
of Human Rights has handed down several rulings on the issue (Leyla Sahin v.Turkey, Dahlab v. 
Switzerland), as have also other institutions (UN Commission of Human Rights: Communication 
No. 931/2000, Uzbekistan, 2005). As it is well known, this matter has also been addressed within 
specific legislation, for example the French law enacted on 15 March 2004. 
 
The aim of this article is to provide a comparative view of the treatment of this conflict within 
case-law, with particular reference to the increasing number of cases in the public eye and the 
fact that the legitimacy of measures taken by the authorities regarding the wearing of the 
headscarf is frequently called into question. In order to illustrate the truth of this, I shall refer, as 
an example, to the recent case of Aishah Azmi, a Muslim teaching assistant in a protestant school 
(Dewsbury, West Yorkshire) who was not allowed to wear the veil on school premises. As she 
did not accept the ban, she was suspended on full pay. An employment tribunal found on 17 
October 2006 that she had been victimised by the school which suspended her (awarding the 
applicant £1,100 for "injury to feelings") but dismissed the claim that she had suffered from 
religious discrimination and harassment. A more recent case concerned a different aspect of this 
problem, in which a dentist in Greater Manchester refused to treat a female Muslim patient 
unless she wore an Islamic headscarf. Finally, it is worth mentioning the latest measure related to 
this issue which is of particular interest: on 10 February 2008, the Turkish Parliament lifted the 
ban over Islamic headscarves in universities by changing the Turkish constitution (the 
constitutional reform received 411 votes in favour from the 550 deputies). However, three months 
later, on 5 June 2008, the Turkish Constitutional Court annulled that reform. As we will see 
below, it was this ban which was at issue in Leyla Sahin’s case. 
 
In order to proceed with this investigation it is necessary to take various elements into 
consideration; which are the rights in conflict in the Islamic headscarf case? To what extent do 
other circumstances affect the content of judicial decisions or specific legislation? Is the country 
involved relevant in this sense (Turkey, France, UK…)? Does the time in which a specific decision 
or rule is adopted also have an impact? 
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2. The case  
 
Our starting point will be the case mentioned above of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, of June 2004 and 
November 2005 (European Court of Human Rights, No. 44774/98), a case that concerns the 
prohibition on the applicant wearing the Islamic headscarf at university.   
 
It is necessary to start from the very beginning. In 1998, the applicant claimed before the European 
Court of Human Rights that her rights as guaranteed by Articles 8, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention, from now on) 
and Article 2 of the First Additional Protocol to the Convention had been violated through the 
prohibition on wearing the Islamic headscarf at Istambul University, where she had moved to 
study her fifth year of Medicine; up until that time, she had studied at Bursa University and had 
worn the veil without any problems. The prohibition was issued by an internal circular and stated 
that, “by virtue of the (Turkish) Constitution, the law and regulations, and in accordance with the 
case-law of the (Turkish) Supreme Administrative Court and the European Commission of Human 
Rights and the resolutions adopted by the university administrative boards”, admission would be 
refused to those “whose heads are covered”, in other words, anyone wearing the Islamic headscarf. 
 
Certainly, it was not the first time that the European Court had been called upon to address the 
question of the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs. There had been many cases in which 
the Court had referred to Article 9, including in particular Kokkinakis v. Greece of 25 May 1993, 
ECHR, paragraph 26, concerning the values underlying Article 9(1) ECHR, or Hasan and Chaush v. 
Bulgaria, of 26 October 2000, ECHR, paragraph 49, on the court's inability to assess the legitimacy of 
religious beliefs. Nor was it the first time that the European Court had faced the Islamic headscarf 
issue; this had already happened in Dahlab v. Switzerland, a case concerning a primary school 
teacher who was not allowed to wear the Islamic headscarf while teaching, in which the Court 
declared the application to be inadmissible. A further application regarding the prohibition of the 
Islamic headscarf at University was brought by the court on the same day as Leyla Sahin’s case 
(Zeynep Tekín v. Turkey, 29 June 2004, ECHR, No. 41556/98); the claimant finally withdrew her 
application and the Court accordingly did not deliver any ruling. 
 
As everybody probably knows, on 29 June 2004, the ECHR unanimously held that “the Istanbul 
University regulations restricting the right to wear the Islamic headscarf and the measures taken 
thereunder had interfered with the applicant’s right to manifest her religion”. Nevertheless, “it 
went on to find that the interference was prescribed by law and pursued one of the legitimate aims 
set out in the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Convention (…); that is, the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others, and the protection of public order. In the European Court’s view, 
this measure “was justified in principle and proportionate to the aims pursued and could therefore 
be regarded as having been “necessary in a democratic society” (see paragraphs 66-116 of the 
Chamber's judgment). The Chamber found that no separate question arose under Articles 8, 10 and 
14 of the Convention or Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, as alleged by the applicant, since the relevant 
circumstances were the same as those examined in relation to Article 9, in respect of which it had 
found there to be no violation. 
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In order to reach this conclusion, the European Court took into consideration “the Turkish context” 
as well as the privileged role of national authorities in assessing local context and needs, “especially 
regarding questions concerning the relationship between State and religions, on which opinion in a 
democratic society may reasonably differ widely, and thus, the role of the national decision-making 
body must be given special importance” 1. The conclusion which emerged from that argument was 
that the safeguarding of the principle of secularism in Turkey, through the ban on the wearing of 
the veil, could be considered necessary for the protection of the Turkish democratic system. 
 
We shall now focus on the Turkish context from the European Court’s point of view. After recalling 
certain dates and events, the Court paid special attention to the new values of the Turkish Republic, 
built on secularism and which strove to create a free public space where equality could be 
guaranteed to every citizen irrespective of differences based on religion or beliefs. In its view, the 
veil is often observed as the political symbol of Islam, attempting to restore a political regime based 
on religious rules which threatens social peace and the achievement of new rights for women. It is 
important not to lose sight of the fact that an Islamist political party came to power (within coalition 
government) in 1996, and how it was perceived by society as a real threat to “republican values” 
(see Refah Partisi and others v. Turkey, 2003, ECHR). Consequently, the Court held that the fact that 
Turkish institutions (University, Supreme Administrative Court and Constitutional Court) banned 
attitudes that could be reminiscent of the past regime could be regarded as a necessary measure for 
the protection of Turkish republican values, and in particular secularism. 
 
The most sensible conclusion we can come to is that the European Court perceived Leyla Sahin v. 
Turkey’s case as if it was Leyla Sahin or Turkey: the veil issue did not involve simply a medicine 
student who finally had to move to another country in order to finish her higher education, but the 
very consolidation of the Turkish democratic system itself, a system threatened – to varying 
degrees – by fundamentalist religious movements. 
 
This ruling, adopted in June 2004, was later referred to the Grand Chamber which delivered its 
definitive judgment in November 2005, once again dismissing the applicant’s appeal. 
 
                                                 
1 “… This will notably be the case when it comes to regulating the wearing of religious symbols in educational 
institutions, especially (as the comparative-law materials illustrate – see paragraphs 55-65 above) in view of the 
diversity of the approaches taken by national authorities on the issue. It is not possible to discern throughout 
Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion in society” (Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 
judgment of 20 September 1994, Series A no. 295-A, p. 19, § 50) and the meaning or impact of the public 
expression of a religious belief will differ according to time and context (see, among other authorities, Dahlab v. 
Switzerland (dec.) no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V). Rules in this sphere will consequently vary from one country to 
another according to national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others and to maintain public order (see, mutatis mutandis, Wingrove, judgment cited above, p. 1957, § 
57). Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations should take must inevitably be left up to a 
point to the State concerned, as it will depend on the domestic context concerned [see, mutatis mutandis, Gorzelik, 
judgment cited above, § 67; and Murphy v. Ireland, no. 44179/98, § 73, ECHR 2003-IX (extracts)]”, para.109. 
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It is interesting to note the details of the applicant’s petitum to the Grand Chamber, as it did not 
claim a general recognition of a woman's right to wear the Islamic headscarf everywhere, thus 
assuming that wearing the veil is not always protected by Article 9 ECHR. I find this point 
interesting because it brings out the real scope of her complaint, that is, the ban on wearing the 
Islamic headscarf in “her” particular circumstances, which should be kept in mind in a case like this 
where “context” is – as defended– so important. 
 
This line of thought (that focusing on “context”) brings us into the realm of comparative law. It is 
worth noting that Leyla Sahin 2005’s ruling gave quite a broad overview of the use of the Islamic 
headscarf in European countries (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Albania, France, Belgium, Austria, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), with particular reference to educational institutions. It can be 
concluded on the basis of that comparative law material that only a few countries have introduced 
regulations on wearing the Islamic headscarf in universities (Turkey, Azerbaijan and Albania; and 
as far as we know also Uzbekistan, which was denounced before the Human Rights Committee in 
20002). In most European countries, the debate has focused mainly on primary and secondary 
schools, where freedom to decide whether to wear the veil or not is generally accepted. The 
interesting point is however less this conclusion, and more the fact that in making such an 
overview the Court tried to focus seriously on the issue for the first time, in particular since 
freedom of religion, belief and thought was at stake, which meant that the states’ margin of 
appreciation was, so to speak, “broader”. The list of countries with problems involving the Islamic 
headscarf is also interesting. It usually includes those in which the veil is an element introduced 
through immigration. In fact, the question is not really the number of Muslims living in a given 
state, but whether or not they are immigrants in that state. That is why countries such as Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland or Slovakia have not so far been involved in any conflict 
regarding the veil: they are either emigration countries (like Poland) or non-Muslim immigration 
countries. 
 
Returning to Leyla Sahin 2005’s ruling, we will find almost the same arguments that the Chamber 
used in 2004. Having found – as the Chamber did – there to be an effective interference with 
freedom of religion, belief and thought granted by Article 9(1) ECHR, the Grand Chamber 
considered whether such an interference was “in accordance with the law”, as settled by Article 
9(2) ECHR, pursued a “legitimate aim” and was “necessary in a democratic society”. The latter is 
indeed the central issue, as it in a way implies the existence of the other two. The difficulty lies in 
the justification and proportionality of the measure adopted, that is, whether the ban on wearing 
the veil was justified and proportional to the aim pursued, and, therefore, could be regarded as 
“necessary in a democratic society”. 
 
The Grand Chamber did not add anything new to the Chamber’s ruling. The aims of protecting the 
rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order were considered legitimate and the 
measure proportional, since the University applied only Turkish case-law and was particularly 
                                                 
2 Raihon Hudoyberganova case, 18 January 2005, UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000), 
Communication. 
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well-placed to consider the requirements of university life. It is interesting to note the use of this 
kind of argument when trying to justify a particular action: indeed, greater proximity to the base of 
the problem (whether the state or a university) presents a priori many advantages: closeness to the 
problem places the subject in a privileged position when attempting to resolve it. On the other 
hand, this could be regarded with suspicion as an ECHR argumentative technique because it could 
be used to justify all sorts of measures with no real solid arguments/basis. All this shows that 
proximity does not necessarily guarantee that the best possible decision for citizens is taken; in fact 
one could argue that a certain distance could be better, insofar as it allows for objective 
observations!. Thus, institutions which are closer to citizens are not necessarily those which are best 
placed to take care of their interests. Safeguarding such interests is precisely the role of judges and 
international courts. 
 
As anticipated, the Grand Chamber saw “ no good reason to depart from the approach taken by the 
Chamber” in this respect. The truth is that after considering the interference with Article 9, it  also 
considered the applicability of Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, which did not occur in 
the previous ruling (even though it eventually concluded that there had not been any violation of 
this article either). 
 
One of the most interesting aspects of Leyla Sahin’s case is undoubtedly, the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Mrs Françoise Tulkens; it was the only dissenting opinion to the ruling adopted, by sixteen 
votes to one, dismissing the student’s application. 
 
Judge Mrs Tulkens questioned the way in which the European Court positioned itself with 
reference to the states “margin of appreciation” in similar cases in which freedom of thought, 
religion or belief was at stake. Why did the Court not practice a “judicial restraint” in cases such as 
Serif v. Greece, of 14 December 1999, or Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v. Moldova, of 13 
December 2001, where the religious freedom of religious communities was involved and the 
respondent states were the Orthodox Christian Greece and Moldova, whilst doing so in Leyla Sahin 
v. Turkey – a secular country with a strong Muslim history and society? In her view, “other than in 
connection with Turkey’s specific historical background, European supervision seems quite simply 
to be absent from the judgment” (paragraph 3 of the dissenting opinion). Indeed, in this case, when 
assessing the alleged grounds for interfering with the applicant’s right to freedom of religion 
through the ban on wearing the headscarf, the majority relied exclusively on the reasons given by 
the Turkish authorities and courts, that is, secularism and equality. Judge Tulkens’ dissent did not 
concern the content of these principles but the way they were applied to Leyla Sahin’s case, which 
did not involve any attempt to harmonise them with freedom. 
 
Focusing on secularism, Judge Tulkens criticised the ECHR for not having reviewed Turkeys’ 
margin of appreciation on the case. In her view, the European Court had adopted a position on the 
meaning of wearing the Islamic headscarf (a political symbol that impacts directly against the 
principle of secularism) by accepting (without question) the reasons given by the Turkish 
authorities. She thus based her criticism not only on the fact the Court adopted a position – which is 
not its role – but also that this position was mistaken insofar as it ignored the multiple meanings 
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associated with wearing the veil throughout Europe. In addition, she criticised the ruling insofar as 
it contained only a general assessment relating to a particular case. That is, the European Court did 
not answer Sahin’s particular claim: whether the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf violated her 
right to manifest her own beliefs. By contrast, it delivered a general ruling on the veil without 
taking into account the particular facts surrounding the prohibition (such as the particular attitude 
of students to the use of the veil and the fact that she claimed to agree with the principle of 
secularism). It seems interesting to me – as Judge Tulkens astutely points out – that this is an 
unusual form of the European Court's “argument technique” (its general approach in fact involves 
observing the particular attitude of the applicant in the case; “ a test the Court has always applied 
in its case-law (Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, ECHR; United Communist Party of Turkey and 
Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, ECHR)” (paragraph 7 of the dissenting opinion).  
 
We now turn to the issue of the rights in conflict: if the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf 
pursued the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and public order, then how could 
the Court value this without going into the facts of the case? This is hardly possible. Nobody 
(neither the Turkish Government nor the Court itself) argued that Leyla Sahin had used the veil to 
exert pressure, provoke a reaction, proselytise or undermine the convictions of others. Nor did 
anybody give any evidence of disorder in daily university life as a result of the applicant wearing 
the Islamic headscarf. Nevertheless, the Court held the prohibition on wearing the veil was 
“necessary”... Why? It seems to me that reasons had nothing to do with Leyla Sahin’s particular 
case. Behind the veil lies the Court’s preconceived approach regarding the Turkish “context”, when 
freedom of thought, conscience and beliefs is concerned. Somehow this approach could be found in 
the ECHR case Refah Partisi and others v. Turkey (February 2003), where the Court held: “In a 
country like Turkey, where the great majority of the population belong to a particular religion, 
measures taken in universities to prevent certain fundamentalist religious movements from 
exerting pressure on students who do not practice that religion or on those who belong to another 
religion may be justified under Article 9 § 2 of the Convention”. 
 
Focusing on equality, Judge Tulkens questioned the general approach that links the ban on wearing 
the headscarf with the protection of women’s rights, also questioning in particular the internal 
limits of the Court’s role. To assert, as the Court did, that the headscarf represents a “powerful 
external symbol”, which “appeared to be imposed on women by a religious precept that was hard 
to reconcile with the principle of gender equality”, would be to go too far. 
 
In conclusion, according to her dissenting opinion, the reasons given to prohibit wearing the 
Islamic headscarf were not relevant or sufficient. Accordingly, the measure adopted by University 
authorities was not “necessary in a democratic society”: in her view, the applicant’s right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion as guaranteed by Article 9 ECHR had been violated. 
 
Judge Tulkens went on to consider the applicant’s other claims, especially that which dealt with the 
right to education protected by Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. She understood that 
Leyla Sahin had “de facto” been deprived of the right of access to the University and, consequently, 
of her right to education. She tried to highlight the lack of proportionality of the measure adopted 
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by the University regarding the use of the Islamic headscarf. What I find most interesting in her 
opinion can be found almost at the end of the dissenting opinion ( in paragraph 19), where she paid 
attention to the inherent absurd of the measure adopted by the University, an educational 
institution, which had nonetheless been accepted by the majority:  
 
“by accepting the applicant’s exclusion from the University in the name of secularism and equality, the 
majority have accepted her exclusion from precisely the type of liberated environment in which the true 
meaning of these values can take shape and develop (...) Experience of this kind is far more effective a 
means of raising awareness of the principles of secularism and equality than an obligation that is not 
assumed voluntarily, but imposed. A tolerance-based dialogue between religions and cultures is an 
education in itself, so it is ironic that young women should be deprived of that education on account of 
the headscarf. (...). Bans and exclusions echo that very fundamentalism these measures are intended to 
combat. Here, as elsewhere, the risks are familiar: radicalisation of beliefs, silent exclusion, a return to 
religious schools. When rejected by the law of the land, young women are forced to take refuge in their 
own law. As we are all aware, intolerance breeds intolerance”. 
 
 
3. The coordinates 
 
The above ECHR case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey was not certainly the only one concerning the use of 
the Islamic headscarf in educational institutions. It was noted at the outset that many cases 
involving this issue have arisen in European countries in recent years and have resulted in various 
judicial rulings or legislative measures. 
 
What is really significant about Leyla Sahin’s case is that it serves as a perfect starting point for 
considering the legitimacy of a ban on the Islamic headscarf, as it contains a number of essential 
“coordinates” which should be borne in mind when resolving such conflicts, “coordinates” that we 
will now discuss. 
 
What “coordinates” will help us plot the course of our research? That is, which specific factors do we 
need to take into account when measuring the legitimacy of prohibitions on the veil? We shall now 
refer to some of the elements which we have identified as relevant to that assessment. 
 
Examining the facts in these cases, there are various significant coordinates against which the 
legitimacy of the measure can be mapped out.  
 
The first refers in particular to the applicants, who are always women who cover themselves with 
the veil as a way of expressing their beliefs. We should consider whether the applicant is a teacher 
or a student at the educational institution where wearing the Islamic headscarf is forbidden; 
moreover, where the person concerned is a student we should focus on whether that student is a 
child or a young adult. Secondly, the types of veil involved differ: it may cover the head and neck 
but not the face, thus still making it possible to identify the women – an aspect that has been 
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considered to be very relevant in some recent disputes3; it may cover the whole body with the 
exception of face, hands and feet –as occurred in Shabina Begum’s case (UK, 2004 and 2006), or 
even involve the burka which also covers the face, leaving a little free space for the eyes). Still 
focusing on the applicant, it is also important to establish whether the wearing of the veil is also 
linked to any particular pattern of behaviour towards other students – namely in order to exert 
pressure, provoke a reaction, proselytise or undermine the convictions of others – or to consider 
any evidence of day-to-day disorders within the university. Besides this, it is also important to 
consider whether the veil is worn as the result of a personal decision or has more to do with 
tradition or even with collective/patriarchal pressure to wear it. These two last points are extremely 
sensitive as they contain a large element of subjectivity, which makes them difficult to prove. 
 
The next step involves focusing on the educational institution responsible for imposing the 
prohibition. Two elements appear to be particularly relevant when determining its legitimacy: first, 
it is important to establish whether we are talking about primary and secondary education or about 
higher education, that is, a school or a University (pupils from a school could be more exposed to 
the potential pressures flowing from the use of the veil); second, we should ask whether the 
educational institution is private or public (the scope for determining educational conditions is not 
the same). 
 
Moreover, it should be pointed out that none of the cases we are dealing with (and to which we 
shall refer below) give consideration to the opinion of those for whom the use of the veil could be 
detrimental, i.e. the students or their parents – especially where the pupils are particularly young 
children. We will see that the institutions responsible for the ban justify such measures by asserting 
that they protect the rights and freedoms of other students, but that the theoretical beneficiaries of 
the ban never participate in the debate. When reference is made to them in some rulings, it is 
precisely in order to point out that there are no real conflicts in educational institutions as a result of 
wearing the veil. Such measures are thus generally taken in order to confront a theoretical threat, or 
a mere potential for harm. In other words, none of the cases is based on an application made by a 
particular student or by someone from the student’s family against another student or teacher as a 
result of wearing a veil.  On the contrary, it is always the woman who complains of the situation, 
not because the use of the veil has been rejected by pupils or parents but because it has been 
prohibited by the institution in which she works or studies. 
 
It is possible to identify a fourth element which it is necessary to consider when freedom of 
thought, religion or belief is at stake. This is the role which freedom of religion plays within the 
State under whose jurisdiction the conflict develops. The situation within a confessional state, such 
as the UK which recognises an official religious confession and tolerates others, is not the same as 
that within a non-confessional State like Germany, which does not identify itself with any belief but 
does attribute legal relevance to religious organisations, which in turn is different from that within 
                                                 
3 See in particular the case of Aishah Azmi referred to at the beginning of this paper, the Muslim teaching 
assistant in a protestant school (Dewsbury, West Yorkshire) who was not allowed to wear the veil on school 
premises: the school highlighted students' difficulties in understanding the teacher when she spoke with her face 
covered (only the eyes were visible). 
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a secular State like France, where church and state are strictly separated. This question is important 
because the courts take this into account when ruling on the legitimacy of measures outlawing the 
veil. The role which the ECHR plays in this kind of conflict seems to me to be of particular interest.  
It should consider the “margin of appreciation” of the respondent state without relinquishing its 
task of supervising that state’s decisions (“... European supervision cannot, therefore, be escaped 
simply by invoking the margin of appreciation”, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, ECHT, dissenting opinion of 
Judge Tulkens, paragraph 3). It should not limit itself to accepting, for instance, a state’s decisions 
without question. In my view, when examining rulings handed down by the ECHR, the role which 
religion plays in a particular state becomes especially relevant due to the ECHR’s “margin-of-
appreciation” approach. Sometimes this approach may be too wide.  
 
We shall now undertake an examination of the measure itself. 
 
It is necessary to distinguish, first, between prohibitions introduced by specific legislation (only the 
French case) and those confirmed in particular court judgments. For the latter, it is necessary to 
consider the particular facts of the case and the concrete way in which the court assesses the 
measure in its final ruling (sometimes this final ruling can be subsequently reversed, as recently 
occurred in the Shabina Begum v. Denbigh High School case, reversed by the House of Lords in March 
2006, definitively dismissing the student’s claim). It is necessary to observe the way in which the 
judge identified the right or rights in conflict and struck a balance between them, along with the 
solution that was finally adopted.   
 
It is necessary to focus first on the way the court considers the particular conflict: it may find that 
there is a conflict between fundamental rights or, perhaps, a single fundamental right whose limits 
should be defined. This aspect deserves especial consideration because it on occasion poses an 
additional problem: the problem of identifying those cases that allegedly deal with a conflict 
between fundamental rights, but in reality “hide” something different, the expression of which is 
not “politically correct” (namely, a preconceived approach to the meaning of the Islamic headscarf).  
 
Second, it is important to focus on the result – the decision itself – i.e. to analyse the details of the 
solution finally adopted, thus questioning for instance whether the court identified the conflict as a 
conflict between fundamental rights or has considered it as a question of limits. Where the court 
finds that it was a question of conflicting rights, to what extent may one right restrict another? Does 
the giving of priority to one fundamental right imply an absolute sacrifice of the other one? 
Alternatively, is it possible to propose other measures that would have a less drastic effect on 
different rights of the applicant (such as for instance the right to education in Leyla Sahin’s case and 
the Shabina Begum v. Denbigh High School case; or the right to of access to a public position in 
Fereshta Ludin v. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany). 
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4. The course 
 
We shall now consider the “course” set by the various rulings or rules on the basis of the 
“coordinates” sketched out above. 
 
- The first case is Dahlab v. Switzerland, brought before the ECHR in 2001 (Dahlab v. Switzerland, 
2001, ECHR, no. 42393/98) by a teacher in a public primary school in Switzerland. The school 
had banned the veil, having found that its use could have an impact on children between 4 and 
8 years of age. In addition, the ban followed the dual purpose of upholding the confessional 
neutrality of education. In this case the material facts, or “coordinates” were therefore the 
following: first, the applicant was a primary school teacher, and thus in charge of pupils who 
could be easily influenced due to their young age and for whom the teacher functioned as a role 
model; secondly, she taught in a public school which, according to the decisions of the national 
courts, made her to some extent a “representative of the state”; thirdly, and closely related to the 
previous point, the veil was regarded as an ostentatious model of religious belief imposed on 
very young pupils; finally, the use of the veil had never given cause for complaint by the 
affected pupils’ parents. 
 
The ECHR was confronted with the applicant’s claim against the Swiss state, following rejection 
both by the national education authorities and in the courts. The ECHR found that the case 
concerned the limits of the claimant’s fundamental rights (the principle of religious neutrality in 
public education, the principle of equality and non-discrimination on the grounds of sex that 
every teacher should convey in the performance of their professional duties). The European 
Court considered the application manifestly to be ungrounded (which is at least surprising, 
given the content of the ruling), rejecting the argument that teachers, as representatives of the 
state, have a particular positive duty of religious neutrality, especially given the lack of criticism 
or complaints during the 3 years she had been teaching before the authorities required her to 
stop wearing the headscarf, finding on the contrary that “it cannot be denied outright that the 
wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytizing effect” on very young children. 
From this perspective, the ECHR’s opinion may be accepted, in the sense that the measure 
adopted is legitimate, because there has been a sufficient assessment of its aim and adequacy – 
its necessity and proportionality stricto sensu. Nevertheless, the ECHR’s ruling should have 
rejected the application, instead of considering it inadmissible. 
 
- Our next case is Fereshta Ludin’s case, brought before the German Federal Constitutional Court 
in 2003. Ludin, a German national and Muslim of Afghan origin had applied for a post in a 
German school as a primary and secondary teacher (specialising in German, English, Economics 
and social and civic education). After having passed the relevant exams, the board of education 
in the state of Baden Württemberg ruled that she was not suitable for this public post as she 
intended to wear the veil in the classroom. 
 
In this case, the most significant facts were the following: first, the fact the applicant had already 
been teaching at that school in a temporary position, during which period her use of the veil had 
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not caused any problems within the school. In this sense the question also arose as to whether 
wearing the veil might pose a real or simply hypothetical threat, as occurred in the previous 
case. 
 
Secondly, other relevant elements are the conflict between fundamental rights, as identified by 
the German Constitutional Court. On the one hand, the applicant’s right to express her religious 
beliefs by wearing the veil, which may be limited by the state's duty of religious neutrality in 
public schools; on the other hand, this right may be restricted by the “negative” freedom of 
religion consisting in the right of pupils and parents to choose the religious education which 
their children are to receive. 
 
The German Constitutional Court referred expressly to the first aspect, finding that the 
protection of ideological and religious neutrality, as guaranteed in the Constitution, did not per 
se require the headscarf to be banned. In this sense it is possible to find a slight difference 
between the way the issue of the Islamic veil is dealt with in this as opposed to the previous 
case. In the previous case, the veil itself constituted a strong religious symbol which tended to 
provoke a certain rejection in judicial and educational institutions; in the latter case on the other 
hand, the veil seems to be considered in a more neutral way, or at least without the negative 
connotations which appear to be present in the previous and many other cases. 
 
However, the Constitutional Court found the fundamental rights to be in conflict with Mrs 
Ludin´s freedom of religion and, regarding the pupil’s right to “negative” freedom of religion, 
stated that this did not imply any right not to be exposed to any religious symbol whatsoever or 
to require all symbols to remain hidden. In a certain sense, the court appears to have weighed 
the conflicting rights in a manner favourable to the teacher’s claims. What is surprising therefore 
is the court’s final decision:  it is favourable to Mrs Ludin, but not as a consequence of a 
consideration of the question of conflicts of rights, but simply because it concluded that the 
school did not have a sufficient legal basis to take such measure, and therefore, until specific 
legislation is passed to authorise such decisions, court rulings would be uphold the right to wear 
the veil. This judgment was accompanied by several dissenting opinions. One of them in fact 
questioned the decision because it did not take a stand on the conflicting rights, in spite of the 
fact that it carefully identified them and considered them in the reasoning leading up to its 
decision. Does this suggest that the court wished to follow an elegant line of reasoning, or 
simply that it did not want to commit itself? 
 
- Continuing in chronological order, we must now discuss the French law of March 2004 which 
banned, as of the beginning of the academic term 2004-2005, the use of “ostensible” religious 
symbols in public schools (Law No. 2004-228, regulating, in accordance with the principle of 
secularism, the wearing of symbols or clothing manifesting a religious affiliation in state primary and 
secondary schools, JO No. 65 17 March 2004, p. 5190) 
 
It is now necessary to focus on the case involving the prohibition on the wearing of the veil in 
French schools, irrespective of whether the veil is worn by pupils, teachers or even other women 
working for the school. This measure aims to protect the values of the Republic, namely 
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secularism. The material facts of this case are the following: first, the norm – a law - was adopted 
in a state, France, whose identity is somehow defined by the strict separation between the 
church and state. Second, there is no other similar bans contained in specific legislation and 
which apply to primary education throughout the country.  
 
Is this a measure that, with the fictitious aim of banning any visible sign of religious affiliation, is 
really intended to prohibit the Islamic headscarf at school (we should not forget that the above 
provision did not prevent the pupils from using “discreet religious signs”, which suggests, for 
example, that it did not intend to ban the Christian crucifix). In passing the ban, the French 
parliament did not outlaw the particular expression of faith through the wearing of the veil in 
public, but rather the goal of Muslims – at least in the opinion of Parliament - of distinguishing 
themselves from other non-believers. As the specific legislation shows (the circular of 18 May 
2004, J.O No. 118 of 22 May 2004, p. 9033), its aim is to prevent the visible manifestation of 
religious affiliation, simply because it is ostensible, that is “capable of being ostentatious”, 
irrespective of the real will of the pupil or teacher wearing the veil. Underlying the legislator’s 
approach is the preconceived perception of the headscarf as a political symbol of a certain belief 
that is not welcome in French society. It may well be the case that certain forms of religious 
fundamentalism use the veil as a political vehicle for obtaining a political result; however, not all 
women who wear the headscarf are fundamentalists. 
 
Even though the principle of proportionality does not apply in the same way to Parliament as it 
does in the courts, some elements of the French ban lead us to question that prohibition. Could 
be the measure adopted be understood as “necessary in a democratic society” within the 
meaning of Article 9(2) ECHR? In other words, is this measure the least restrictive one? Is this 
measure the best available for obtaining the goal pursued –namely the application of the 
principle of secularism in public schools - after balancing the benefits to society and the harm to 
women of a ban on the veil?  
 
In my view, there are many other means of apply the principle of secularism in public education 
that seem to be more suitable and less restrictive on freedom of thought, religion and belief than 
a general ban such as the one contained in the law: for instance, a clampdown on selective 
absenteeism in natural science or physical education classes.   
 
- We now turn to the case explained in full at the start of this paper, that is Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, 
June 2004 and November 2005, ECHR, No.44774/98. In this case, the conflict concerned a 
university student who wore the Islamic headscarf during her first four academic years at Bursa 
University, and encountered problems following a move to Istanbul University. In this 
university, an internal dress code prevented the veil from being worn during certain activities 
including “lectures, courses or tutorials”. The most relevant elements were, in the case, the 
following: first, the role played by Islam in Turkey, a state where the vast majority of the 
population is Muslim, although secularism constitutes the cornerstone of Republican values. 
This first element should also be understood in the light of its recent history during which 
fundamentalist political movements started to emerge: every single Turkish institution 
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(including the Constitutional Court) seemed to fight against the threat posed by 
fundamentalism, that is, the restoration of an Islamic state. The second important element is 
certainly related to the first: wearing the veil is perceived by Turkish institutions as the political 
symbol associated with that threat. The Turkish Courts dismissed the applicant’s arguments in a 
general and abstract manner, without providing any concrete example relevant to the 
circumstances of this case - for instance the fact that the case did not involve a child (as occurred 
in the cases referred to above) but a young adult woman. The court found that the case involved 
a conflict between fundamental rights (the freedom to manifest one’s religion by using the veil 
versus the others’ “negative” freedom of religion), although the conflict appeared simply to hide 
the question of limits on the applicant’s right to manifest her religion, with the veil appearing to 
be “censured” on abstract grounds. 
 
The European Court accepted Leyla Sahin’s application against the Turkish state. According to 
the Court’s approach to the case in its 2004 judgment, the Turkish authorities were “better 
placed” to decide what to do in such a sensitive area (on account of the margin of appreciation 
of states) and in so doing they did not violate any Convention provision. As we already know, 
the case was appealed to the Grand Chamber, which found that there had been no violation of 
the Convention (with particular reference to Articles 9 ECHR and 2 of the First Protocol). 
However, the ruling was not unanimous, and was accompanied by the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Tulkens. She argued that there had been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention and 
Article 2 of the First Protocol. In reaching this conclusion Judge Tulkens analysed the aim 
pursued by regulations on the wearing the veil in higher education institutions, and the 
proportionality between this goal and the measure itself. As a result of this analysis, the Judge 
concluded that the reasons given by the majority in finding the interference to be “necessary in a 
democratic society” pursuant to Article 9(2) of the Convention were irrelevant and insufficient. 
More specifically, she criticised the majority's ruling insofar as it did not answer the questions 
posed by the applicant regarding her particular behaviour at university, nor did it weigh up the 
possibilities of other measures having less drastic effect on the applicant’s right to an education, 
and did not weigh up “the competing interests” (damages/benefits) in the case. 
 
- The following case is the Raihon Hudoyberganova case of 18 January 2005, UN Human Rights 
Committee (CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000) Communication, the material facts of which were largely 
similar to the Leyla Sahin case, with Uzbekistan as the respondent state . Again, the case involved 
a university student and an internal circular banning the use of the Islamic headscarf on 
university premises. This time, however, Uzbekistan was condemned by the Human Rights 
Committee for violation of the applicant’s freedom of religion through the ban on wearing the 
veil.  In the Committee’s view, there had been absolutely no appreciation of the fact that there 
had been an interference with the freedom to manifest one’s religion by using the veil, and that 
such limitations could only be imposed in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. It is necessary that such measures pursue a legitimate aim and can be 
considered necessary in a democratic society. This limitation was not properly justified in this 
particular case, and therefore the Committee found that Uzbekistan had violated Article 18(2) 
ICCPR. 
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- It is finally necessary to refer to one of the most controversial cases: Shabina Begum v. Headteacher 
and Governors of Denbigh High School [2004]. Although the ruling was handed down in 2005, it 
was reversed by the House of Lords on 22 March 2006. This case involved a primary and 
secondary public school in Luton, England, where the applicant had studied for several years 
before being rejected for not wearing the school uniform. Some basic facts are already known, 
the case concerning a state-fun non-confessional school within a confessional State, the UK. 
However, there are also a number of new elements: the veil in question was of a particular 
kind (a full-length gown referred to in the case as a jilbab) that covers the whole body with the 
exception of face, hands and feet. The most interesting elements in Shabina Begum’s case are, 
therefore, the following: on the one hand, we are dealing with a conflict over the wearing of 
the Islamic headscarf in a country like the United Kingdom that recognises the Anglican 
Church as the official Church and tolerates other faiths; on the other hand, the school is state-
run and non-confessional, in which the cultural and religious plurality of its community 
presumably deserves recognition. In addition, the school has a meticulous and sensible – I 
would say – uniform policy, aimed at contributing to the members' internal cohesion, without 
disregarding the different religious sensibilities (to illustrate the truth of this, an item called 
shalwar kamezee, a long traditional garment from the Indian subcontinent was integrated to the 
school uniform, with the specific agreement of the Islamic community, which enjoyed a 
considerable representation within the school). It was in this multicultural context where the 
unfortunate incident occurred which resulted in Shabina Begum being excluded from the 
school: wearing the school uniform became the sine qua non condition for her return, and the 
school failed in all attempts to find an alternative solution for her schooling.  
 
The 14 year-old student claimed that the school had violated her rights to freedom of thought, 
religion and belief, as well as to an education, as guaranteed by ECHR (incorporated in a 
particular manner under the British Constitution by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998). In 
March 2005 the Court of Appeal accepted her application, holding there had been an 
interference with the student’s freedom of religion. In the Court’s view, no justification for the 
interference had been provided by the school authorities; by contrast, the school had simply 
defended its uniform policy. The aim pursued by that uniform policy appeared (also to the 
Court of Appeal!) without doubt to be commensurate, and hence the objection essentially 
concerned the way in which the uniform provisions were applied to Shabina Begum’s case 
(namely proportionality). According to the Court of Appeal, other schools could in future 
successfully defend their uniform policies by balancing the conflicting rights in the right way. 
The court even discussed the best course to be followed, with precise indications in relation to 
the proper “argumentative iter”. 
 
However, by following the proper “course”, that is, giving appropriate justification for the 
limitation, the House of Lords reversed the lower court's ruling in March 2006, now 
dismissing the student's claims. The new found that a whole range of sensitive elements had 
to be considered when assessing the proportionality of the measure, including in particular 
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the significant attempts by the school to integrate the student in to the school community 
without renouncing to its uniform policy.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
It is now time to draw some conclusions, that is, to share some final thoughts and reflect on our 
initial question: “the Islamic headscarf: Does context matter?” which, actually, means: “to what 
extent does context matter?” 
 
One of our premises is that the assertion that freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as any 
other fundamental right, is not absolute. This means that it can be subject to limitations, as long as 
such limitations be prescribed by law and “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others”, pursuant to Article 9 ECHR. 
 
It is now necessary to consider the particular conflict considered in this paper: the wearing of the 
Islamic headscarf in educational institutions. Using the Islamic headscarf constitutes, undoubtedly, 
an exercise of the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs, through the use of a particular 
garment of religious significance. Hence the prohibition on its use is also, undoubtedly, a measure 
that interferes with that freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs.  
 
In that sense, every single case referred to in this paper falls under the same schema. They all refer 
to a Muslim woman who covers herself with a veil to express her beliefs, and the prohibition of this 
practice by the educational institution which she attends as a teacher or student, resulting in her 
making a complaint before the courts. The only exception is the French case which, from the outset, 
derives not from a particular conflict but from specific legislation banning the use at school of 
“ostentatious religious symbols”. The ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf occurs therefore, in the 
French case, ope legis. Far from being of secondary importance, this fact has an enormous impact, 
because the courts and Parliament do not approaches the issue in the same manner with respect to 
conflicting rights issues. Therefore, in most cases, it has been necessary to focus on a court rulings, 
which implies the use of specific legitimacy benchmarks in relation to the measures adopted. It also 
implies a particular approach to the conflict: one which reflects the applicant’s view, whose 
application constitutes the basis for the court’s work.  
 
The fact that most cases follow a very similar schema does not however imply that the assessment 
of the measures adopted must necessarily be the same, because, as we have already noted, there are 
too many different material circumstances. In some cases, banning the veil could be considered 
justifiable on the facts. But this should not be necessarily taken for granted in other cases dealing 
with an identical restriction of the freedom to manifest one’s religion4. And the same argument 
                                                 
4 It should also be remembered how in Leyla Sahin’s case the student recognised, in the observations she 
submitted to the Grand Chamber on 27 January 2005 that she was not seeking legal recognition of a right for all 
women to wear the Islamic headscarf in all places, inter alia in these terms: “Implicit in the section judgment is the 
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applies a contrario: the legitimacy of the measure need not be denied simply because it has been 
denied previously.  
 
To conclude, legitimacy of the measure adopted depends on the facts of each particular case. Far 
from being obvious, this assessment tries to offer an answer to the frequent social questioning 
posed both “in favour of” or “against” the ban. In my view, the ban on wearing the Islamic 
headscarf cannot be assessed in the abstract, because where the Islamic headscarf is concerned 
context really matters. It is not possible to settle the conflict once and for all, declare ourselves to be in 
favour or against the ban.  It will always be necessary to consider whether the measure adopted has 
been legitimate on a specific occasion, as this depends entirely on the circumstances of each 
particular case. In other words, to draw conclusions on some of the cases discussed in this paper, 
in the opinion of the author the assessment of the prohibition of the veil is not for example the 
same in the case Dahlab v. Switzerland as it is in the case Leyla Sahin’s v. Turkey. This is for the 
simple reason that in the first case the woman wearing the veil was a schoolteacher and her pupils 
were children of a young age (persuasive arguments at present indicate that such a garment may 
exercise a huge influence on children). On the other hand, in the second example chosen the 
woman wearing the veil was an adult student who was censured for defying by her individual 
conduct the system enshrined in the constitutional order of her state, which is at the very least a 
questionable assertion given the particular facts of the case.  
 
 
6. ECHR Decisions 
 
Date Ref. Case 
29.6.2004 JUR 2006\204654  Zeynep Tekín v. Turquía 
8.1.2004 JUR 9414 Leyla Sahin v.Turquía 
10.7.2003 TEDH 162877 Murphy v. Irlanda 
13.12.2001 - Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v. Moldavia 
31.7.2001 TEDH 2001\496 Refah Partisi and others v. Turquía 
15.1.2001 - Dahlab v. Switzerland 
26.10. 2000 - Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria 
14.12.1999 TEDH 70 Serif v. Grecia  
30.1.1998 TEDH 1 United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turquía 
25.5.1993 TEDH 1993\21 Kokkinakis v. Grecia 
 
                                                 
notion that the right to wear the headscarf will not always be protected by freedom of religion. [I] do not contest 
that approach” (par. 73). 
 
